During the Second World War, Portugal declared a policy of neutrality.

Dutch and Australian troops nonetheless disembarked at East Timor in

disrespect of Portuguese sovereignty. But the real menace came with the

Japanese invasion, three months later, in February of 1942. The island

became a stage of war between Japanese and the allieds. Timorese were seen

as secondary actors when in truth, after crossing a period of rebellion

against Portuguese rule, were they the more sacrificed during the

resistance until 1945.

In spite of Portugal's policy of neutrality, the Australian and Dutch

troops entered in Timor. It was the first of two foreigner military

invasions. In Lisbon, Oliveira de Salazar denounced the allied disembark as

an invasion of a neutral territory. Shortly after arrived the Japanese.

It's not to admire that J. Santos Carvalho saw in these actions an attitude

of depreciation towards the sovereignty of Portugal. When the allied forces

arrived at Dili in December the 17th of 1941, he says that governor

Ferreira de Carvalho, without means to retaliate by arms ordered the

national flag to be hoisted in all public partitions and buildings of the

colony. To further mark his position of neutrality he confined himself to

his residence and, by free determination, wished to be considered prisoner.

The population of the capital went to live in the interior, mainly in

Aileu, Liquie and Maubara. Some of the few Portuguese that remained in Dili

pursued nevertheless with their usual lives, socializing with the forces

stationed in Timor. They were given instructions by the local government to

maintain a correct attitude but to show no familiarity neither to

collaborate. An atmosphere of normality gain form, and some families were

prepared to go back. It is even reported that an agreement signed by

English and Portuguese governments defined that the allied troops would

retire as soon as arrived a contingent of Portuguese forces from Maputo

(Mozambique).

What happened instead was the Japanese invasion of Dili, in February

of 1942. During January they had managed to occupy Malaysia (except

Singapore), the Philippines (but not Bataan), Borneo and the Celebes,

Birmania, New Guinea and the Salmon islands. Following general L. M.

Chassin - “at the end of the second month of an hyperbolic invasion , the

Japanese tide extended itself irresistibly beyond paralyzed and impotent

adversaries.” In the middle of February they invaded Sumatra occupying

Palembang, soon after Singapore is attacked and many Englishmen are made

prisoners. Java was surrounded and on the 20th, Bali and Timor were taken.

After a weak resistance , the Dutch troops abandoned by the Javanese

soldiers -- which were in majority --, escaped to the interior leaving

behind armament. Dili was then violently sacked by the Japanese, who found

the city almost uninhabited.

The Portuguese colonial empire

Up to the final years of dictatorship in Portugal, in spite of the

condemnation of UN and the start of the guerrilla warfare in the African

colonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, the Portuguese Colonial Empire

was defended by the government as an heritage of the glorious past and

motive of national pride. However, the crescent expenses of it's

maintenance begun to reflect increasingly on the economy and social tissue

of the metropolis, what provoked crescent discontentment of the population,

finally leading to the Revolution of '74 that installed democracy and gave

independence to the colonies. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia precisely

in the course of decolonization.

During dictatorship, the colonies continued to be dedicated

considerable interest. For the nationalist ideology that characterized the

regime, the vast regions of the World under Portuguese sovereignty were to

be seen as the justification of a necessary conscience of greatness and

pride to be Portuguese.

The expression "Portuguese Colonial Empire" would be generalized and

even met official formalization. Colonial patrimony was considered as the

remaining spoils of the Portuguese conquests of the glorious period of

expansion.

These notions were mystified but also expressed in Law as in 1930

Oliveira de Salazar (at the time minister of Finances and, for some time of

the Colonies) published the Colonial Act. It stated some fundamental

principles for the overseas territorial administration and proclaimed that

it was “of the organic essence of the Portuguese nation to possess and

colonize overseas territories and to civilize indigenous populations there

comprised”. The overseas dimension of Portugal was however soon put at

stake after World War II. The converging interest of the two victorious

superpowers on the re-distribution of World regions productors of raw

materials contributed for an international agreement on the legal right for

all peoples to their own government. Stated as a fundamental principle of

the UN Charter, anti-colonialism gave thrust to the independist movements

of the colonies, and in matter of time unavoidably accepted by the great

colonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such countries

relied on mechanisms of economical domination that would last, assuring

that political independence wouldn't substantially affect the structure of

trade relations.

Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions. The first problem

that the Portuguese had to deal with was the conflict with the Indian

Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed over

the English occupation, and in 1956 forced the French to abandon their

establishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese over their

territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face of refusal. India severed

the diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in order to

reach the two enclaves dependent of Daman was denied since 1954, and

despite the recognition of such right by International Court of Justice

recognized t (1960), Dadrб and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This was

followed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were still

able to hinder until December 19 of 1961, when the Indian Union made

prevail it's superior military force, to obtain final retreat of the

Portuguese.

Goa had been capital of the Portuguese expansion to the East.

Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center of

religious diffusion to the point of being called the Rome of the Orient. In

spite of it's the historical and spiritual importance, the reactions

against the military attack of the Indian Union parted mainly from official

sectors, and only moderately shared by the public opinion. For the

historian J. Hermano de Saraiva whom we have followed, it reflected the

dominant politic ideologies: at the end of the XIXth century, the

colonizing activity was considered a service rendered to civilization but

since World War II viewed as an attempt to the liberty of the peoples. This

“doctrinal involucre of interest to which the Portuguese were completely

strange was rapidly adopted by the intellectual groups, in great part

responsible for the formation of the public opinion”. That's how Saraiva

justifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to the Indian Union were

directed less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities, “for

not having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for both parts”.

More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a tendency that would

accentuate along the two following decades: the crisis of patriotism. To

defend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois elites of

the 60's as a provincial attitude, expression of cultural under-

development.

Indonesian invasion

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on US

diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisation

from Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of an

official "embargo".

There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have

sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation and

inform their associates in the Indonesian military command that the

atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self-

determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international court

of justice. “We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing to

recognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of saving

the remnants and providing reparations” - a small gesture of compensation

for terrible crimes.

Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to

the ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, and

organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants - and their sons -

have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture,

rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violent

repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people

(the original people of East Timor) since.

Even before president Habibie's surprise call for a referendum this

year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over

East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with "the aim, quite

simply... to destroy a nation".

The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruited

thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously,

the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus special

forces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trained

intelligence specialist with "a reputation for callous violence".

Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forces

responsible have been described as "rogue elements" in the west. There is

good reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of direct

responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have been

managed by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit" that

had "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their

behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends".

These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the

Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of the

indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the tactics employed by

the Contras" in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were "not simply going

after the most radical pro-independence people, but... the moderates, the

people who have influence in their community."

Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian military

in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: "If the pro-

independents do win... all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23

years ago". An army document of early May, when international agreement on

the referendum was reached, ordered "massacres should be carried out from

village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-

independence supporters win". The independence movement "should be

eliminated from its leadership down to its roots".

Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian press

reported that "hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are

being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at the

ballot box".

All of this was understood by Indonesia's "foreign friends", who also

knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguous

reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a "green

light" to carry out their work.

The sordid history must be viewed against the background of US-

Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of the

archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a central

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