A collective human right with regard to the environment is not generally accepted. It is included in the Rio Declaration concluding the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) (visited Aug. 5, 2002) <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/rio.declaration.1992.html>. by reference to the right to development. The Vienna Declaration adopted the same position. § I/11 of the Declaration states “The right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.” Vienna Declaration (visited Aug. 5, 2002) <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocumet>. In many documents this right was mentioned not as a collective right but among the rights of individuals. For example, Commision on Human Rights Resolution 1999/23, “Adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights”, § 4. (visited Aug. 5, 2002) <http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/dec/1998/edec1998-242.htm>. The collective environmental right is provided by the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in the following formulation: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development”(article 24). African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (visited Aug. 5, 2002) <http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html>.

The right to humanitarian assistance is described in the guiding principles for the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations as having cardinal importance for the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies See, for example, General Assembly RES/45/100 of 14 December 1990 (visited Aug. 5, 2002) <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r100.htm>.. However, there is no mechanism to enforce this right at the international level (except for the ACHPR).

We could see that there are many collective rights declared in international and regional human rights instruments, and recognized by the international community. However, some commentators suggest that the status of collective rights as international human rights standards still remains ambiguous. Burns H. Weston Human Rights the Content of Human Rights: Three Generations of Rights (visited July 24, 2002) <http://www.uichr.org/features/eb/weston4.shtml>. On the reason that a “people” cannot consist of anything more than the individuals who make it up, collective human rights are viewed as a non-existing concept and considered as rights of all individual human beings. Jack Donnely, Human rights and collective rights, in Human Rights in a Pluralist World. Individuals and Collectives 43 (Jan Berting et al. ed., 1990). Many authors consider these rights to be too vague to be justifiable, and nothing more then slogans promoting goals of the United Nations, and sometimes even used for propaganda purposes in some countries. Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights Problems of Law, Policy and Practice 201 (1995). Besides, the skeptical attitude towards collective rights is largely based on supposed impossibility of enforcement of collective rights. Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights Problems of Law, Policy and Practice 204 (1995). The current trend in the international human rights law and theory shows weakness of these views . “Unqualified resistance to the idea of collective human rights is not very productive for the pragmatic reason that such rights already exist.” (Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 73 (2001).) Moreover, many authors and legislators agree that the traditional system of individual human rights combined with non-discrimination provisions is not sufficient for the protection of the rights of individuals as group members. J. Donnely, Third Generation Rights, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 91 (Catherine Brolmann et al. ed., 1993.)

Nonetheless, there is widespread opinion that indiscriminate recognition of numerous demands or values as human rights would weaken the idea of human rights in general. Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights Problems of Law, Policy and Practice 201 (1995). However, the inclusion of collective rights (the right to political determination and the right to sovereignty over natural resources) in the two fundamental universal human rights instruments over thirty years ago has not ruin individual human rights and it is doubtful to do so. Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 73 (2001). In the same way many authors are afraid of possible underestimation of individual rights in favor of collective rights. This idea is supported by the fact that the worst violations of individuals' human rights occurred in the name of some “inspiring abstraction”, such as “the one true faith”, “the nation”, “the State”, etc. The term “people” is an abstraction as well. As a result, grave abuses of individual human rights might occur under “legitimating” label of collective interest, if any of the individual rights and freedoms protected by modern international human rights law ever will be regarded as in some sense inferior to peoples' rights. Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 368 (1995). On the other hand, there is a view that “peoples... are above all people” Eugene Kamenka, Human Rights, Peoples'Rights, in The Rights of Peoples 133 (James Crawford ed., 1988). and that consequently such order has its advantages as well. According to the latter approach the main function of collective rights is still their benefit to the individual. Groups have no ultimate or necessary value, but they are a way in which individuals achieve various ends, which are necessary or desirable (in particular the good of community and the fulfillment of certain human capacities and attributes which are best fulfilled in community.) James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples 167 (1992). There is an opinion, that recognition of collective rights as human rights is meaningful as far as specific collective goods are essential for human self-realization. Such a conception of collective rights is called the “collective” conception, as opposed to the “corporate” one. The latter conception implies that rights are held by a single corporate entity and used for pursuing a common aim, unconnectedly to any individual composing it; whereas in the “collective” conception the rights are united, but the interests of the group members are different. Peter Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 2. 86-88 (1999).

At all events, collective human rights are considered as an important component of the protection of individual human rights, as, for example, wars and local armed conflicts are clearly the most significant causes of violations of individual human rights. The collective character of the first rights is justified from the insider perspective of the suffering individuals, who frequently experience their suffering as group suffering. William F. Felice, The Case for Collective Human Rights: the Reality of Group Suffering, Ethics and International Affairs 48 (1996). Furthermore, since 1945 the object for many serious human rights violations were ethic groups as such. Therefore as the injustice is uphold by hostile attitude towards groups, the solution requires the promotion of the dignity of groups. Michael Freeman, Are there Collective Human Rights? 32-33 (1995). A clearer definition of collective rights would probably help reconcile conflicting views. The meaning of “peoples” notion is uncertain itself. There are many groups within a State - is every one of them entitled to be called “peoples” and claime, as a result, for its rights to be recognized? Is any given individual a member of a certain group sharing the group's rights? Perhaps the most advanced definition would be the following one: “[Peoples are] collective entities based upon unifying, spontaneous [as opposed to artificial or planned] and permanent factors, as rule beyond the will of the members of the group.” J. Donnely, Third Generation Rights, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 92 (Catherine Brolmann et al. ed., 1993). In addition, the territorial basis of such unifying has to be taken into consideration in almost all situations.

The next suggestion of the collective rights' critic is the uncertainty of the opposing party in emerging obligation. It is not difficult to identify the entities that have the duty to respect and secure the rights of individuals (the State, its government, or other public authorities). This obligation is imposed on those who have it in their power to perform them. Hence, it is not clear who is in power to ensure for people the right to dispose of its natural wealth and resources for example. In Karel Vasek's view the solidarity rights are rights with undetermined subjects and opposing to all centers of power. Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 74 (2001). That power can be spread very thinly over other States, public and private ,national and international bodies, and many individuals. The right to peace, the right to a healthy environment and similar rights can be considered as rights even not of a group of people, but of the whole human race entailing obligations of all the above-mentioned subjects and the human race itself. It is almost impossible to demonstrate that any one, or more of them has breached the obligation, since collective rights might be viewed as being “higher” than the level of states' responsibility, which argument supports the opinion about legal non-enforceability of collective rights.

The possible solution could be to regard a state as responsible before it's population for performing in it's competence the duties imposed by collective rights' obligations, and as a representative of it's population in protecting these rights on the international level, Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 485 (2001). bearing in mind that these are primarily governments, who have to take the prime responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights. Jose Ayala-Lasso, The Universality of Human Rights, in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. The Quest for Universality 94 (Daniel Warner ed., 1997).

Some commentators consider collective rights as a product of both the rise and the decline of the nation-state in the last half of the 20th century. Burns H. Weston Human Rights the content of human rights: Three generations of rights (visited July 24, 2002) <http://www.uichr.org/features/eb/weston4.shtml>. In this case collective rights are understood as reflecting the emergence of Third World nationalism and its "revolution of rising expectations" (i.e., its demand for a global redistribution of power, wealth, and other important values or capabilities) and suggesting the impotence or inefficiency of the nation-state in certain critical respects. Burns H. Weston Human Rights the content of human rights: Three generations of rights (visited July 24, 2002) <http://www.uichr.org/features/eb/weston4.shtml>.

Considering the role of states with regard to collective rights some writers “distrust” collective rights since states might interpret these rights as state's rights widening the area for individual rights abuses. However, states violate the rights of collectives in the same way as they violate the rights of individuals. They also promote the rights of collectives as they promote the rights of individuals. Therefore, collective rights have to be opposable to the states in the same manner as individual rights. Considering the nature of collective rights, some of them have to, and are able to be opposed against foreign states and against the international community as well. The latter characteristic demonstrates an unarguable advantage of collective rights before individual rights. Jack Donnely, Human rights, individual rights and collective rights, in Human Rights in a Pluralist World. Individuals and Collectives 72-73 (Jan Berting et al. ed., 1990).

The status of collective rights differs not only in scientist's views, but also in accordance with a kind of geographical criterion. Collective rights are traditionally given more attention in the non-Western societies, where the communal dimension is more important to individual well being than in the Western societies. The interests of the group are automatically among person's interests. Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 67 (2001). On this reason international human rights frequently undergo critic in the non-Western countries, since the conflict between the individual and the community is the base of the human rights law originated in the Western countries. The promotion of collective human rights expresses the efforts of non-Western governments to assert their values on international level. As an example of this tendency may serve the 1976 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples adopted in Algiers. Upon the non-Western way of thinking are based the so-called collective “Third Worldist” and “globalist” approaches Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 70 (2001). to collective human rights similarly perceiving these rights as a proper response to the globalization and the unconditional control of the Western countries over the international politics.

In this way some commentators challenge the universality of collective rights on the ground, that some groups of peoples do not need them at all. It can be true with regard to minority and indigenous peoples' rights, but this argument is void concerning other collective rights, which are attributed to all people. For example, peoples from rich countries enjoy a right to development on an equal base with people from poor ones, but the protection of the first's right does not require any action. In the same way providing for special rights to children or women doesn't violate their universality. Eva Brems argues that human rights can be stipulated on behalf of certain categories of individuals or groups as long as these same rights are not denied to others. Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 71 (2001).

It seems that the arguments against collective rights are often based on the fact that many people are less sympathetic to the rights of others as a group, especially, when that group is perceived as very different. J. Donnely, Third Generation Rights, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 149 (Catherine Brolmann et al. ed., 1993). The international collective human rights' concept is still in process of development, and that we may say about many of international human rights. However, such a view is particularly true with regard to this group of rights. The potential of collective rights is great and the view that “individual human rights … are a safer and probably more effective course to pursue human rights” J. Donnely, Third Generation Rights, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 149 (Catherine Brolmann et al. ed., 1993). will probably change. Collective human rights are recognized and protected in many of international human rights documents. There is a large academic interest to the topic as well, especially in connection with the globalization issues. And, although there is a role for international human rights instruments they in themselves will not rid the world of human rights violations. Rebecca Wallace, International Human Rights: Text and Materials 104 (2001).

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